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Internet Power and Social Context: A Globalization Approach to Web 
Privacy Concerns 
Rivka Ribak and Joseph Turow 
 
Contemporary perspectives on the Internet don't recognize negotiations about its meaning that 
take place in many societies, causing the Web to be defined simultaneously in terms of local 
cultures and world markets. We propose a “globalization” perspective that can help researchers 
situate a society’s cultural and technological practices within broad political and economic 
parameters, identify global forces and local voices, and study dynamics of their co-existence. As 
an exploratory foray, we compare U.S. and Israeli parents' attitudes toward Web privacy. The 
findings call attention to a need for historical and geographical considerations at every level of 
Web research. 
 
Many observers in the United States relate the adoption of the Internet to a sense of 
erosion in domestic privacy and parental authority. Numerous books, academic articles, public 
opinion polls, and press reports (as well as solutions and regulations) alert Americans to the 
allegedly inescapable consequences of the introduction of an additional eye (ear/mouth) into the 
home's technological environment (Andrejevic, 2002; Cai & Gantz, 2000; Shapiro, 1998; Turow, 
2001). The tone of inevitability underlying the discourse about Web privacy in the United States 
implies that these concerns also carry over into other societies as the Web spreads across the 
world. Yet, while seemingly the ultimate metaphor of globalization, the Web is experienced 
locally by individual users embedded in particular families, cultures, and politics. In what ways, 
then, do users' approaches to the Web derive from their “indigenous” cultural construction of the 
machine? Where do they draw on U.S. values and fears, as embedded in U.S. cultural and 
technological exports? 
Our purpose here is to suggest a framework for answering these questions by 
constructing the Web's global and local faces as a dialogue that is anchored within transnational 
political and economic bearings. By situating a society's cultural and technological practices 
within broad political and economic parameters, we can identify global forces and local voices, 
and study the dynamics of their co-existence. As an exploratory foray using this approach, we 
present a comparative survey of U.S. and Israeli parents' attitudes toward the Web and Web 
privacy. The survey highlights the cultural specificity of information disclosure practices but 
suggests, at the same time, that global influences may be at work. As constituted, the data do not 
allow us to causally tie these complex patterns to particular extra-national influences. They do, 
however, help define the areas in which these influences might be fruitfully explored in future 
studies, and they point out the usefulness of bringing historical and geographical considerations 
to every level of Web research. 
The Need for a Global System Perspective 
Accounts of the global spread of the Web have tended to adopt two contrasting 
narratives. According to the first, technology's inherent features spark the same opportunities and 
challenges and so, the same concerns and meanings, for users around the world (for an 
elaboration, see Buckingham, 2000; Fischer, 1992). The alternative narrative insists that 
technology—both the hardware and the social meanings that are associated with it—is socially 
constructed (see MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999). 
Works that adopt the first, essentialist/universalistic narrative, assume that technology 
affects people and societies in predictable and inevitable ways. Writing about privacy, for 
example, Garfinkle (2000) argues that “[t]echnology is not privacy neutral. The overwhelming 
tendency of technology is to out privacy. By its very nature, technology is intrusive” (p. 260). 
These works note that the Web's elementary hardware—computers, monitors, and network 
connections—can be seen everywhere one looks. The same holds true for the basic software—
the browsers, search engines, chat rooms, and instant messaging systems that link millions of 
“surfers” worldwide. These works imply, therefore, that the whole world is exposed to 
essentially the same Web; and that effects, problems, and solutions inescapably derive from the 
technology, and are generalizable universally to virtually all locales. (see, for example, 
Cavoukian & Tapscott, 1997; for discussion, see Agre, 1997; Bennet & Grant, 1999.) 
Relativist works, by contrast, suggest that although the telephone, radio, and television, 
for example, have distinctive technological features, the social meanings and controversies 
around these features developed over time through elaborate interactions among various 
constituencies, value systems, and regulatory regimes (Marvin, 1998; Rakow, 1992; Silverstone 
& Hirsch, 1992). From this perspective the fluid, multilingual, and radically interactive Web, in 
particular, subverts any attempt to construe it as a fixed entity, as it allows for and indeed 
cultivates intertwined and mutually-constitutive relationships between medium, text, and 
consumers/audiences/users (see, for example, Lyon & Zureik, 1996). 
In this way, relativist works introduce users into the study of the human-machine 
interaction and position them as active shapers, decision-makers, and producers of meaning (e.g., 
Ribak, 1997). Significantly, they situate users within communities, in actual times and places 
(e.g., Bakardjieva, 2003; Na, 2001). Thus, arguing for the embeddedness of ongoing human-
machine interdependence, Livingstone (1998) emphasizes the significance of sociopolitical and 
economic context in relation to an important project on “young people and the changing media 
environment in Europe” that she helped coordinate: 
 
Contexts of media use are elaborated…in two main ways. First, differences in social, 
cultural, economic and political structures both across and within European countries 
are likely to make a difference to children and young people's media use. Second, 
among western countries these structures are themselves subject to broader processes 
of modernization, processes which have particular significance for young 
people…To the extent that different countries represent different positions on these 
broad structural variables, including the diffusion find appropriation of media, 
comparative analysis offers a kind of natural experiment for explaining the meanings, 
uses and impacts of new media within each country (p. 445). 
 
The Need for a Third View 
The technological-universalistic and constructionist-relativist narratives of technological 
diffusion and globalization, of cultural adoption and localization, are clearly incongruent and 
indeed mutually exclusive. It is interesting, then, that what is common to both is a reluctance to 
situate the human-machine encounters they explore in the context of transnational political and 
economic relations that underlie these processes. Thus, where essentialist thinkers privilege the 
Web's global impact with little attention to local contexts, relativist and comparative analyses 
similarly overlook the interplay of the local with the transnational. Livingstone (1998), for 
example, practically rules out a cross-cultural research design in which countries are structurally 
interdependent or disproportionately influencing one another when it comes to new media. She 
argues that “to make…comparisons [between countries] manageable in practice, the research 
should be restricted to modernized, western countries which are undergoing related sociopolitical 
changes; overlarge national differences would prevent observations interesting in one country 
being informative for another” (1998, p. 445).1 
The upshot of this guiding principle is that the dominant interest in reporting the results 
of the European project is on cross-national comparison without cross-national influence. Thus, 
four of the five studies presented in a European Journal of Communication issue devoted to the 
twelve-country project headed by Livingstone (1998) treat the countries they compare as 
unrelated entities. They ignore the fact that many are geographically close to one another, many 
share languages and cultural products, and all belong to a European Economic Community that 
is developing pan-continental rules about electronic commerce, Internet privacy, and a host of 
other activities that affect life on the Web. The one exception to this hermetic approach (Lemish, 
Drotner, Liebes, Maigret, & Stald, 1998; see also Drotner, 2001) offers an account of 
globalization as a conflation of cultural practices. Yet it still avoids asking where the “global” 
originates, what forces lie behind its interpenetration of the local, and whether that 
interpenetration takes place differently in countries that have substantially different sociopolitical 
and socioeconomic environments. 
 
The Utility of a Political Economy of Cultural Globalization 
In order to account for users' cultural constructions of technology and to make sense of 
their specific ideas about Web privacy, we must contextualize technological development and 
human practice within broad economic and ideological parameters. Both software and hardware 
play a major role in today's international trade. The economic relationships that develop in the 
world markets for such information products recall the division of nations into a political 
hierarchy of core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral nations that Immanual Wallerstein and others 
have employed for analyzing international domination (Wallerstein, 1980; Skocpol, 1984). The 
model proposes that certain economic actors (predominantly corporations), based in a few core 
nations or regions, hold determinant influence on both the disposition and the effective 
operation, as well as the output, of less developed peripheral and semi-peripheral parts of the 
world. This, in turn, “enables the extension of the authority of the economic and social model” 
encouraged by the core nations (Gaspar, 1999, p. 3). 
Recent writings on globalization challenge the construction of international economic 
hierarchy as an explanation for the colonialist shaping of social actions and attitudes. Placing 
caveats on such linear reasoning, they raise important questions about the nature and direction of 
ideological influence (see Curran & Park, 2000; Robertson, 1997; Sreberny-Mohammadi, 
Winseck, McKenna, & Boyd-Barrett, 1997). Appadurai (1996), for example, insists on the 
subversive, local, and liberating potential of globalization for diasporic ethnics around the world. 
But the emphasis on the democratizing potential of global access runs the risk of overlooking the 
political economy of power. Such perspectives may thus underestimate the role that economic 
domination emanating from hegemonic nations or regions plays in framing local cultural ideas 
about what a particular technology should “do,” how it ought to be distributed and used, and to 
whom it ought to be sold. 
In an attempt to develop an approach to media technology that is sensitive to the interplay 
between global  forces and local appropriations, we suggest a political economy of cultural 
globalization. Our perspective conceives of globalization as a dialogue between hegemonic 
interests and cultural practices, and uses the international economic and political power structure 
as a starting point for investigating transnational ideological influences. At the same time, it 
contextualizes and historicizes those local attitudes, practices, interpretations, and ideologies that 
assign culturally specific positions, roles, and meanings to technologies. As a result, it is 
attentive to the flows of influence from many directions, at many levels, and across time. 
This dualistic approach is crucial when it comes to the Internet and information 
disclosure. By its very nature, the topic involves an intersection of global forces and local voices, 
technological facts and cultural choices. In political-economic terms, the Internet was developed 
at the core of the world system, among the wealthiest and most powerful nations. With 
significant European contributions, it evolved mainly in U.S. scientific establishments, originally 
for military purposes. Core-country corporate Internet leaders such as Microsoft, Intel, AMD, 
and 3Com subsequently situated strategic outposts in parts of the world that reflect different 
positions along an innovation/cheap-labor continuum: Some nations (e.g., Finland, Israel, and 
India) are relied on for their ability to contribute cutting-edge knowledge about hardware and 
software. Other countries (e.g. Indonesia and Malaysia) provide inexpensive, stable, and 
compliant manufacturing conditions. Independent firms in all regions vie to provide the large 
companies with component parts as well as to export their own innovations to Web-linked 
consumers (Kellerman, 2000). 
What is especially interesting about these relationships is that firms based outside the 
core often find it most profitable to create software and hardware that do not necessarily speak to 
their own cultural, practical, and ideological concerns. Instead, they address their products to 
their most prominent markets (Arora, Gambardella, & Torrisi, 2001). Web privacy, security, and 
child surfing, for example, are topics that have generated huge investments by consumers and 
Web firms in the world's wealthiest regions. To participate in the revenues engendered by 
software and hardware tied to these concerns, industries at the periphery and semi-periphery of 
the western economy must keep up with debates regarding media policy and technological 
fixes that take place in front of U.S. regulatory agencies, the European Commission, and within 
English-speaking academic circles. 
What are the implications of such globalizing tendencies for members of a non-core 
society when the values embedded in their major, core-oriented software and hardware exports 
do not resonate with their own local sentiments? For example, will members of a non-core 
society translate their traditional views on information disclosure into Web attitudes and 
practices even when they do not match the Web-privacy approaches that occupy global media 
and business interests? Such questions imply propositions regarding comparative research that 
are quite different from the ones that Livingstone posits about the comparison of equivalent, 
impermeable core countries. Here the emphasis is on sharply different socioeconomic conditions, 
on often-contrasting political and cultural circumstances, and, importantly, on international 
relationships and cross-influences. 
 
The Case of Israel and the United States 
A comparison of attitudes between Israelis and Americans on Web-related topics allows 
us to begin deciphering the interplay of technology, hegemony, and the local construction of 
meaning. The positions of Israel and the United States within the hierarchy of the global system 
are strikingly different. In contrast to the United States, a continent-spanning nation of more than 
300 million people with a gross domestic product of U.S. $36,200 per capita, Israel, with about 
6.4 million inhabitants, has a GDP of U.S. $18,900 per capita (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
2002). Similarly, whereas the U.S.'s international economic and military influence places it 
unchallenged at the core of the world system, Israel may be considered outside that core.  
Despite the large share of knowledge-based export in its economy (Israeli Ministry of Finance, 
2002) and in contrast to additional indicators of economic growth,2 Israel's troubled borders and 
slate of occupation and the related military expenditure, as well as comparative measures of 
inequality (Adva Center, 2002) relegate it to an intermediate position in the world system. 
In spite of this gap, Israel is increasingly linked to the United States by high-tech 
relationships. Many U.S.-based multinational firms—Intel, Cisco Systems, 3Com, IBM, and 
Microsoft—have established foreign subsidiaries and R&D centers in the country. Moreover, a 
large number of indigenous companies are competing with an eye to creating hardware and 
software that can serve security, privacy, networking, and broadband needs in the United States 
and elsewhere. The Israeli economy has been intent on satisfying U.S. and European demands 
for high-tech and often Web-related products. As the partner in a major high-tech venture fund 
noted (San Francisco Business Times, 2002), “Israel is a very export-oriented country (p. 37).” 
A computer industry recruitment site aimed at English speakers (Hi-Link, 2002) 
exemplifies the two-way flow between Israel and the United States, suggesting that although 
exports throughout the globe are the goal, a U.S. frame of reference is dominant. In mid-2002, 
the site noted that “like other high-tech centers around the world, the high-tech industry in Israel 
is directly impacted by the stalled U.S. economy (p. 1).” Nevertheless, it pointed out, “with some 
one hundred (mostly high-tech) companies traded in the U.S., Israel is second only to Canada in 
terms of foreign presence on U.S. stock markets (p. 3).” Consequently, “with the establishment 
of many American subsidiaries in Israel and the development of the internet in English, your 
mother-tongue is definitely an asset (p. 6).” 
The mutual Israel-U.S. interest that we identify at the corporate and worker levels is 
crucial at the level of management. Israeli executives keep their ears to the ground regarding 
social as well as technological developments in core regions of the world (especially the United 
States, Europe, and the United Kingdom) with an interest in capitalizing on the needs that arise 
in these potential markets. From pioneering Firewall security software in the early 1990s to 
recent encryption products that address recording conglomerates' problems with Web-based 
copyright infringements many home-grown innovations are heralded in the general Israeli press 
not for speaking to Israeli sensibilities but for expanding exports. Newspapers' financial sections 
provide their readers with detailed reports about U.S. regulatory and advocacy debates about the 
nature and right to information privacy as well as parents' concerns about keeping their children 
safe from objectionable content and predators on the Web. These developments come up in 
discussions of new product possibilities, in the coverage of Israeli privacy violations, and in the 
typical reporting that goes on about things American. 
But the linkage with the United States is not limited to business interests. Growing fast, 
the number of Israeli surfers was a bit less than a third of the nation's homes in early 2002.3 With 
relatively few sites in Hebrew available to them,4 Israeli users navigate to U.S. sites and 
communicate through U.S. applications, using software and hardware that (wherever produced) 
map onto U.S. ideology in general and concerns about privacy in particular. Moreover, films 
such as The Net, which enact U.S. information disclosure nightmares, are frequent television 
fare. Prevalent, too, are magazine and newspaper feature articles that translate U.S. concerns into 
local parlance. 
Israeli media have paraded U.S. concerns about digital information disclosure as at once 
prophetic of things to come and as being different and quintessentially American. The foreign 
accent of the coverage of privacy issues stands out both in the close watch reporters keep on 
privacy developments—technological, legislative, and regulatory—in the United States (and to a 
lesser extent, Europe), and in the breadth and depth of the analyses that they provide. This 
detailed complexity stands in a sharp contrast to the scarce reports on privacy issues in Israel. 
Few and far between, the local stories speak to the essential confrontation between regulators' 
efforts to introduce standards of privacy and common counter-arguments in the name of national 
security. The high-tech reporter of HaAretz, Israel's elite newspaper, opined that most Israelis 
have not considered Web privacy concerns as relating to their society. He added that the press' 
conscious U.S. orientation on these topics reflects a sense that American judicial and legislative 
activities raise interesting conflicts and issues that might stimulate thinking in Israel, where 
legislative and judicial awareness of this area is undeveloped (Y. Dror, personal communication, 
2002). 
The relative indifference to privacy violation that the press implicitly attributes to its 
audience is in fact in line with the collectivist strands of the country's founding ethos. Israel was 
established on an explicit socialist ideology in which individuals were firmly situated as 
members and partners in the project of nation-building (see Ben Raphael, 2000), rather than lone 
adversaries of big government and centralized power. The country was, and arguably still is, a 
“recruited society” (a nation in arms, see Kimmerling, 1993; Kimmerling & Moore, 1997) in 
which the boundaries between the self and the collective, between personal needs and desires 
and national imperatives and objectives—and thus, between on- and off-stage and between 
public and private life—are difficult to outline. Further, while the country has witnessed strong 
pulls toward privatization and individualization during the past decade and a half, recurrent 
national threats appear to strengthen Israelis' commitment to the collective and reduce whatever 
centrifugal tendencies they may have temporarily entertained. Thus, when 15-year-old Ofir 
Rahum was kidnapped and murdered by a Palestinian woman he met through the ICQ instant 
messenger (just 2 weeks before the Israeli survey), newspaper coverage adopted the conventional 
framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict. References to the danger of information disclosure on the 
Web were overwhelmingly subordinated to the discourse on national security. 
Structurally, too, personal privacy is treated differently in Israel from the U.S. Unlike 
Americans, Israelis must carry an official picture identity card. While an American driver’s 
license and social security number may seem comparable to the Israeli ID, symbolically and 
functionally they are profoundly different (Etzioni, 1999). Israelis' ID numbers identify them in 
most of their encounters with both government and non-government institutions (for example, 
medical and university authorities), and citizens over 18 are required to carry the card at all 
times; the use of the social security card, on the other hand, is legally, normatively, and 
practically restricted, while the driver license is, by definition, voluntary. Israelis cannot (or find 
it difficult to) reinvent themselves due to both the close watch of the Ministry of Interior (and the 
ID it issues) and the country's size; Israelis know each other. Related to that is the fact of the 
army. While the myth of universal draft is no longer sustainable, it is nonetheless the case that by 
the age of 18, every Israeli youth can expect to be called by the army for pre-military 
examinations and checks. The results of the tests form the basis for the personal file that will 
accompany him or her in the years to come. 
Focusing on Israeli society alone, we might expect that these particular local 
circumstances would directly influence Israelis' attitudes about Web privacy. Yet, as we have 
seen, very different perspectives on information disclosure in relation to the Web appear on 
Israelis' media radar screen in discussions of U.S. (and, to a lesser extent, other international) 
business concerns and social reports about the Internet. To what extent, then, do Israelis translate 
their relative tolerance for information disclosure offline into their computer privacy practices? 
Do they follow the hegemonic preoccupation with the Web's (inevitable) information leakage? 
Do they develop a construction of the Web that reflects their traditional information disclosure 
practices, or are these global and local influences blended in some way? In an attempt to gain 
initial insight into such intertwined transnational cultural interrelationships, we compared U.S. 
and Israeli views on the Web, gathered in surveys on Web attitudes that were conducted in the 
United States and in Israel. 
 
The Surveys 
The U.S. survey was undertaken in early 2000 (Turow & Nir, 2000a, 2000b), before this 
comparative investigation was conceived. That survey was a follow-up to a study conducted by 
the second author in 1999 (Turow, 1999). The study was the first academic exploration of U.S. 
parents' attitudes and reported activities regarding the Web as it related to their children. One aim 
of the 2000 survey was to track differences from the previous year's findings regarding what 
parents were generally thinking and doing about the Web. To do that, the survey presented 
parents with 14 statements about the potential benefits and harms of the Internet for children, 
which were asked in the original survey. It asked parents how much they agreed or disagreed 
with each of the assertions along a five-point scale, from agree strongly to disagree strongly. The 
survey's second aim was to explore an emerging issue. As teenagers were becoming major users 
of the Web, commercial sites were increasingly gleaning information from them for marketing 
purposes. The 2000 study asked how parents and youngsters (teens and tweens, a marketing term 
for 10-12 year olds) conceive of releasing information to Web sites and, if they regarded it as a 
problem, whether they wanted anything done about it. 
The survey addressed the concern about the Web and the leakage of family information 
through 14 statements about privacy and the Web. Parents and youngsters were asked how much 
they agreed or disagreed with each of the assertions along a similar 5-point scale. Also included 
were scenarios aimed at comparing what the youngsters say would be acceptable for teens to 
reveal to Web marketers as compared to what their parents say would be acceptable for teenagers 
to reveal.  
Although the questionnaire was not created for use in cross-national comparisons, we 
realized that a Hebrew translation would offer a unique opportunity. For researchers interested in 
the cultural construction of the Web, it could provide an exploratory window on the extent to 
which parents in two countries have similar strong beliefs about the technology's benefits and 
problems. And, from the specific standpoint of developing a political economy of globalization, 
we could note where Israeli respondents located themselves, when it comes to the Web, along 
the range between specifically “Israeli” and mediated “American” attitudes to information 
privacy. 
Roper Starch Worldwide conducted the research for the Annenberg Public Policy Center. 
Telephone interviews were conducted with a nationwide cross-section of 1,0015 parents of 
children 8- 17 in homes with Internet connections. The Random Digit Dialing (RDD) sampling 
methodology was used to locale respondents. During the interviews, parents were asked to 
answer questions while thinking about their child aged 8-17, who had the most recent birthday. 
When the child the parent had focused on during the interview was at least 10-17 years old, an 
attempt was made to also interview that child. When that child was not available, another 10-17 
year old child in the household was interviewed. Approximately half of the 304 children 10-17 
year-olds that were interviewed were selected from the same households as the parents. The 
other half of the children's sample (for which parents were not interviewed) was located using 
the Random Digit Dialing (RDD) sampling methodology. All the interviews were conducted 
January 13 through February 17, 2000. Interviews with the adults averaged 20 minutes and the 
ones with the kids averaged 10 minutes. 
The Israeli interviews were conducted by the Machshov survey firm one year after the 
ones in the United States (January-February 2001). The RDD and interview procedures used 
were the same as in the earlier study.6 The comparison, then, is between random samples of 1001 
U.S. adults and 304 adolescents, and 1000 Israeli adults and 305 adolescents, who lived in 
households with online computer access and at least one child between ages 8 and 17. This 
paper, however, will focus on the parents' responses. 
 
The Survey Findings 
The two samples of adults were similar on a number of basic demographic variables. In 
each sample, 41% of the respondents were male and 59% were female. The vast majority of each 
group (83% of the Americans, 85% of the Israelis) were employed. Similarly, around half of the 
parents (57% of the Americans, 55% of the Israelis) were aged 30-44; almost all the rest (33% of 
the Americans, 44% of the Israelis) were aged 45-59. Most parents in each sample were married, 
though the proportion of married Israelis (92%) was higher than the proportion of married 
Americans (79%). Similarly, 50% of the Americans and 45% of the Israelis had college or post-
graduate degrees. 
It is impossible to know, of course, whether the similarities in these labels actually mask 
major cultural differences in what the labels mean. Certainly, the presence of two very different 
societies came through in the absence of “race” as a relevant category in Israeli society and its 
replacement by “country of birth” and “country of father's birth.” In the same vein, answers 
about “household income” point to a very different scale in the two countries, as Israel's average 
income is substantially lower than that of the U.S. 
In fact, the Israeli survey firm did not consider it appropriate to ask the American income 
question, which directly solicited the parent’s family income bracket. Instead, the parent was told 
that the net average household income in Israel is 8,000 New Israeli Shekels and asked to state 
whether his or her household income was around that average, a lot or a little lower, or a lot or it 
little higher. Only 10% responded that they fell below the average, while 57% said they rose 
above it—an indication, albeit indirect, that the sample was substantially wealthier than the 
nation as a whole. The more “direct” U.S. question was elusive in its own way: Since 26% 
refused to report their yearly income, it allowed even less inference about the online families' 
socioeconomic standing. Those who did answer, however, reflected a group that was only 
somewhat wealthier than the nation as a whole. 
Against this backdrop of similarities, differences, and the ambiguous meanings of both, 
one major difference stood out immediately between the two samples in relation to use of the 
Internet: While 94% of the U.S. adults said that they had personally used the Internet, only 64% 
of the Israeli adults reported that. Clearly, a much higher percentage of Israeli than American 
parents had bought the service for their children only. Among the Israeli adults who did report 
getting on the Internet, the perceived sense of expertise was similar to their U.S. counterparts 
(see Table 1). 
Nevertheless, that a third of Israelis with the Web at home weren't users at all might 
suggest that these Israeli nonusers' privacy attitudes should properly be compared with 
Americans who don't have the Web in their homes. The 1999 study comparing the attitudes of 
U.S. parents in households with computers but with and without the Web at home found that the 
latter were somewhat more negative about the Web's ability to improve their children's lives. The 
1999 study didn't plumb privacy attitudes, but it did lead us to wonder whether Israeli parents 
with the Web at home who have never used the Internet would be more concerned about privacy 
than those who have had direct experience with it. 
Table 2 presents the responses to statements about the Web of all the online U.S. parents, 
all the Israeli parents, the online Israeli parents who have used the Web, and the online Israeli 
parents who have not used the Web. Overall, the differences between the Israeli groups are small 
and not significant statistically.7 By contrast, the differences between the Israeli and U.S. 
samples are substantial as well as statistically significant. 
The answers from the U.S. and Israeli parents to the 14 statements about potential 
benefits and harms of the Web reflect very different mind-sets about the Web. U.S. parents hold 
strong opinions about its effects. Large numbers believe that it is a useful and even critical 
component of a child's education, and large numbers believe, often at the same time, that it gives 
youngsters access to content with “troublesome” values. Substantial percentages of Israeli 
parents, by contrast, are much more skeptical of the technology. They don't believe the hype 
about its advantages and they don’t accept the rhetoric about its dangers. Twice as much as U.S. 
parents, however, they worry about their ability to help their children navigate the new 
technology. 
For example, while 74% of U.S. parents agreed or agreed strongly that “children who do 
not have internet access are at a disadvantage compared to their peers who do have access,” only 
23% of Israelis answered that way. In fact, on all of the “positive” statements about the Web, 
U.S. parents were far more likely than Israeli parents to agree or agree strongly. U.S. parents 
were far more prone to say the Web is a safe place, that it helps their kids with homework, that 
their children discover “fascinating, useful things,” and that it can help them “learn about cultural 
diversity and social tolerance.” 
Israeli parents also tend to be mellower about potentially negative effects of the Web than 
are their U.S. counterparts. Almost half (46%) do express concern about the Web's ability to 
interfere with family values—around the same percentage of U.S. parents expressing the 
concern. Yet substantially smaller percentages of Israelis than Americans are concerned about 
the possibility of bad effects of specific Web content. Almost twice as many U.S. parents as 
Israelis (59% vs. 31%) agreed or strongly agreed that “going on line too often might lead 
children to become isolated from other people.” Similarly, 72% of U.S. parents were concerned 
over exposure to sexually explicit images on the Internet, as compared to 28% of Israeli parents; 
62% of the U.S. parents, and 31 % of Israeli parents were concerned over exposure to violent 
images. And, while 741% of U.S. parents reported that they were “concerned that children give 
out personal information about themselves when visiting Web sites or chat rooms,” only 24% of 
Israeli parents agreed.8 
Israeli parents did say in substantially higher proportions than their U.S. counterparts 
(48% to 26%) that they “often worry” that they won’t be able to explore the Web with their 
children as well as other parents do. That about half of Israeli parents had such a feeling of 
deficiency is interesting in view of the Israelis' self-evaluation of Web expertise, which was 
similar to U.S. parents, and their overall mellow altitude to Web effects. At the same time, 
Israelis' expertise with Web marketers was admittedly relatively limited. Only 25% of them, as 
compared to 60% of the Americans, reported that they have read Web site privacy policies more 
than once or twice. Moreover, 53% of the U.S. sample indicated that they bought something over 
the Internet, compared to only 30% of the Israelis. 
We wondered whether these countervailing tensions that didn't show up nearly as much 
in the U.S. parent population—mellowness versus a felt deficiency, general expertise versus 
specific inexperience with marketers— would translate into clear cultural differences regarding 
the teenagers' release of family information to marketers. What we found was more complex 
than these straightforward differences. On the one hand, a clear majority of both Israeli and 
American parents reflected the kinds of information privacy concerns that the Israeli press had, 
in fact, continually discussed as American internet privacy issues. On the other hand, the Israeli 
parents did diverge strongly from their U.S. counterparts along cultural lines with respect to 
naming who has the responsibility to try to solve these privacy problems.  
 
Responses on Information Privacy 
When it comes to the kind, of information parents say are acceptable for teens to give to 
Internet marketers, the differences between Americans and Israelis seem to be a matter of degree 
rather than of kind. As Table 3 shows, Israeli parents were consistently more likely to agree that 
it was acceptable for a teenager to release certain types of information to marketers in exchange 
for a free gift. Yet for most categories, the percentages of both Israelis and Americans agreeing 
about the giving out of data were well under 40%. Moreover, about the same small percentage of  
 
 
parents (24% of U.S. and 20% of Israeli parents) said they themselves would answer a variety of 
personal questions to marketers in exchange for a free gift when it was given a cash value. 
Clearly, then, Israelis' traditionally tolerant attitude toward information disclosure did not show 
through strongly here. Most people in both parent populations were uncomfortable about 
themselves or their offspring confiding family information to marketers. 
Table 4 reflects these differences in degree but also indicates key differences that 
distinguish the Israeli from the American perspective on Web information privacy. The table 
notes the percentages of Israeli and U.S. parents who agreed strongly or somewhat agreed with 
14 opinions about privacy. The table indicates that Israeli parents tended to be generally less 
concerned than U.S. parents about Web privacy considerations regarding themselves and their 
family. At the same time, for many of the statements, the gap in perspectives between the two 
populations wasn't that great (not exceeding 10%). 
Answers to several statements do, however, suggest that major cultural differences 
between the U.S. and Israeli respondents are also at work. According to one finding, more 
American than Israeli parents (60% to 37%) confirm that their concern about Web privacy has 
increased since going on line. Another finding indicates that substantially more American than 
Israeli parents admit being nervous about Web sites having information about them (72% to 
52%). A third finding suggests one reason for the lower percentage of Israelis compared to 
Americans: A far smaller segment of the Israeli parents (54% to 31%) knows that Web sites 
collect information about them even when they don't submit information. The dissimilar answers 
to these statements imply that although Israeli and American parents profess concerns about 
information privacy, the Americans are more engaged than the Israelis with concerns about the 
Web and how to deal with them. 
 
Additional divergences in the answers between the two groups suggest that when it also 
comes to responsibility for knowing about and acting on issues of Web privacy, Israeli parents 
depart from their U.S. counterparts in kind, not just degree. The first three statements in Table 4 
reflect differences in what might be called a locus or privacy responsibility. An overwhelming 
percentage of Americans agreed or strongly agreed that parents (first statement), government 
(second statement), and business (third statement) ought to be deeply involved in ensuring a Web 
safe from teens' disclosure of information. Israelis, by contrast, were much less invested in the 
responsibility of any of these entities. The differences are particularly stark if we look 
specifically at the percentage of parents who agreed strongly with them. Agreeing strongly 
implies a certain high concern about a policy issue; simply agreeing does not. We found that 
only 18% of Israeli parents, compared to 53% of the U.S. parents, agreed strongly that they 
expect businesses to help them with privacy—that they “look to see if a Web site has a privacy 
policy before answering any questions.” Moreover, while 88% of U.S. parents agreed strongly 
that “I should have a legal right to know everything that a Web site knows about me,” only 43% 
of Israeli parents felt strongly about it. Similarly, 84% of U.S. versus 43% of Israeli parents 
agreed strongly that “teenagers should have to get their parent's consent before giving out 
information online.”9 
These differences in the locus of responsibility also translate into different practical 
conclusions that U.S. and Israeli parents draw from their sense of growing privacy exposure. 
While a large proportion (47%) of Israeli parents compared to U.S. parents (10%) note that one 
of their children has “given out information he or she shouldn’t to Web sites,” only 4% of the 
Israelis (compared to 19% of the Americans) have installed filters to try to keep some control 
over the sites the teens can visit—even though one third of the Israelis (and 78% of Americans) 
say they have heard of filters. This contrasting attitude toward a parent-initiated technological fix 
was even more striking when we explained the functions of filters and monitors to them and 
asked them, “If someone offered to help you put an internet filter or monitor on your computer 
for free, would you want the filter, the monitor or both?” Whereas 82% of the U.S. parents 
wanted one or both of these devices, only 43% of the Israelis did. 
Conclusion 
This exploratory cross-cultural comparison has yielded patterns of difference and 
similarity that speak to both the cultural construction of privacy (and technology) and the 
political economy of globalization. The responses by Israeli and American parents reveal very 
different perspectives on the Web's power and the locus of responsibility for controlling it. We 
noted that Israeli parents are much more skeptical than their U.S. counterparts about the 
transforming possibilities of the Web: They don't buy the hype about the Internet's advantages, 
and they don’t accept the dystopic rhetoric about its dangers. In comparison, the answers of the 
American parents stand out as almost frantic over the impact of the Web (positive and negative) 
on their family lives. 
Israeli and U.S. parents also don't see eye-to-eye when it comes to important aspects of 
domestic privacy and the Web. Far more American than Israeli parents say that their concern 
about Web privacy has increased since going online. Far more Americans say, too, that they are 
nervous about Web sites having information about them. Israelis also don't have nearly the 
commitment the Americans have to parental, governmental, or business solutions to Web privacy 
problems. They seem, instead, to feel that teens themselves should shoulder the burden of 
policing the borders of privacy. 
Seeing these differences side-by-side underscores the constructed nature of the Web. To 
explain them, one can point to the traditional Israeli commitment to the collective over the 
private and to the continual sociopolitical tension that naturalizes and renders acceptable the 
violation of privacy by the government and military. The United States, by contrast, has created a 
hallowed position for individual privacy, though in ideal more than in practice. In the words of a 
New York Post commentator, “Americans don't like invasions of privacy, be it internet-, health 
care- or financial-related” (Lambert, 2001, p. 62). The disjunction between what Americans 
believe ought to be and what government and business often refuse to allow creates social 
tensions through which public advocacy groups try to force those institutions to create solutions. 
Government and business, by contrast, often reply by thrusting the responsibility for protecting 
privacy back to the hands of individuals and parents. That may lead to the tripartite solution that 
the survey uncovered among Americans, but not among Israelis. 
This model highlighting local cultural constructions of the Web and Web privacy does 
not, however, fit all our data. We found that a clear majority of Israeli parents set aside their 
society's customary laxness over information privacy and agreed with American parents about 
the importance of not disclosing information to the Web. The great percentage of parents in both 
societies acknowledges being uncomfortable about themselves or their offspring confiding even 
rather superficial family information to marketers. Israelis' concerns mirror the American worries 
that they had seen and heard through a variety of print and electronic media channels, including a 
U.S.-centered Israeli version of the Web. 
The similarities and differences imply that a complex dynamic is at work. The findings 
indicate that cross-cultural influences are intermingling with local cultural constructions to form 
a peculiar mix, neither American nor fully continuous with the Israeli “indigenous” tolerance for 
disclosure. We suggest that exposure to U.S. Web issues on Israeli media along with export-
minded discussions of U.S. high-tech throughout society are leading Israeli parents to adopt 
Web-privacy worries that do not resonate with the nation's traditional privacy practices. Yet 
when it comes to the more profound step of actually acting on these issues—deciding if 
government or business or parents should take responsibility for preventing information 
disclosure—traditional Israeli perspectives on privacy do transfer to the Internet. 
These explanations clearly need to be investigated further. What we have as a result of 
this research, though, are sharp indicators that a complex combination of forces is shaping Israeli 
responses to the Web and strong possibilities that some of those forces originate outside Israeli 
society. Comparative surveys across time can help us explore how much, how, and exactly why 
Israeli society is becoming more “American” in its attitudes toward the Web as Israeli business 
and media continue their Americentric scripts when it comes to high-technology. Comparative 
field research is also necessary to understand the actual ways that parents in the two societies 
approach the Web on the ground. How they are changed, by how much, and what resistance 
there is to “imported” views, are topics that require work both within and across portions of the 
global system. 
The argument that some influences on Web attitudes reflect the global political economy 
even while other influences are local is a position that society-specific cultural accounts often 
ignore. Our framework and comparative survey findings suggest that, instead, it is a direction 
that needs to be explored. The challenge for researchers—particularly when it comes to countries 
outside the center or the world economy, but also in relation to those in it—is to continually 
relate people's altitudes, actions, and interactions to the national and global sociopolitical system. 
That, metaphorically and practically, is what “the Web” is really about. 
 
 
 
Notes 
1
 This theme is developed in the volume that concludes the project; see Livingstone el al. 
(2001), pp. 11-12. 
2
 About one quarter of Israel's export income consists of high-tech products (see Israel 
Central Bureau of Statistics, 2002), Israel leads the world In the number of scientists and 
technicians m the work force, with 140 per 10,000 (as opposed to 60 in the U.S., over 70 in 
Japan, and fewer than 60 in Germany). The percentage was augmented by the massive influx of 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s, which included a large percentage of 
scientists, engineers, and technicians. See Hi-Link (2002). 
3
 That is a high proportion among the world's countries but still considerably smaller than the 
approximately 50% of the U.S. homes. This estimation is based on TIM-Teleseker poll data cited 
in Barabash (2001) and Central Bureau of Statistics (2002), plate 2.1 b. 
4
 The Hebrewization of Internet tools (e-mail, Web etc.) is astonishingly slow, suggesting 
both the extent of English usage by Israeli surfers, and their readiness to shift to English when 
using this medium. 
5
 The sampling error for percentages based on the entire sample of 1001 parents is 
approximately plus or minus 3.5 percentage points. The sampling error is larger for smaller 
subgroups within the sample. 
6
 Although the Israeli study was conducted a year later than the U.S. survey, we have no 
reason to believe that societal or technological changes would have caused the U.S. parents' 
responses to have changed during that time. It also bears noting that the two samples of parents' 
responses to the same questions in the U.S. 1999 and 2000 surveys were strikingly similar to one 
another. 
7
 Differences between these two groups of Israeli parents were also generally not statistically 
significant with respect to the variables in Tables 3 and 4, so we do not present them. 
8
 One finding did seem to diverge from Israeli parents' mellowness: Although 59% of U.S. 
parents believe that “people worry too much that adults will take advantage of children on the 
internet,” only 19% of the Israelis agreed with the statement. One reason for the higher 
percentage not willing to write off concern about adult exploitation might be the highly 
publicized Internet-related kidnapping and murder of the Israeli boy that look place two weeks 
before the survey. Press coverage might have been fresh in the minds of many of the 
respondents, who may consequently have interpreted taking advantage as meaning physical 
danger. The answers to the other statements show that the majority of online Israeli parents 
seems not to have generalized its worry about the physical danger of adult exploitation through 
the Web to other areas of potential concern. 
9
 All these differences were statistically significant at the .01 level using chi-square. 
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